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Opinions

Majority Opinion Author

Sonia Sotomayor

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit

No. 22–842. Argued March 18, 2024—Decided May 30, 2024

Petitioner National Rifle Association (NRA) sued respondent Maria Vullo—former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS)—alleging that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated parties to punish or suppress the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy. The Second Circuit held that Vullo’s alleged actions constituted permissible government speech and legitimate law enforcement. The Court granted certiorari to address whether the NRA’s complaint states a First Amendment claim.

The NRA’s “well-pleaded factual allegations,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–679, are taken as true at this motion-to-dismiss stage. DFS regulates insurance companies and financial services institutions doing business in New York, and has the power to initiate investigations and civil enforcement actions, as well as to refer matters for criminal prosecution. The NRA contracted with DFS-regulated entities — affiliates of Lockton Companies, LLC (Lockton) — to administer insurance policies the NRA offered as a benefit to its members, which Chubb Limited (Chubb) and Lloyd’s of London (Lloyd’s) would then underwrite. In 2017, Vullo began investigating one of these affinity insurance policies—Carry Guard—on a tip passed along from a gun-control advocacy group. The investigation revealed that Carry Guard insured gun owners from intentional criminal acts in violation of New York law, and that the NRA promoted Carry Guard without the required insurance producer license. Lockton and Chubb subsequently suspended Carry Guard. Vullo then expanded her investigation into the NRA’s other affinity insurance programs.

On February 27, 2018, Vullo met with senior executives at Lloyd’s, expressed her views in favor of gun control, and told the Lloyd’s executives “that DFS was less interested in pursuing” infractions unrelated to any NRA business “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups, especially the NRA.” App. to Pet. for Cert. at 199–200, ¶21. Vullo and Lloyd’s struck a deal: Lloyd’s “would instruct its syndicates to cease underwriting firearm-related policies and would scale back its NRA-related business,” and “in exchange, DFS would focus its forthcoming affinity-insurance enforcement action solely on those syndicates which served the NRA.” Id., at 223, ¶69.

On April 19, 2018, Vullo issued letters entitled, “Guidance on Risk Management Relating to the NRA and Similar Gun Promotion Organizations.” Id., at 246–251 (Guidance Letters). In the Guidance Letters, Vullo “encourage[d]” DFS-regulated entities to: (1) “continue evaluating and managing their risks, including reputational risks, that may arise from their dealings with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations”; (2) “review any relationships they have with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations”; and (3) “take prompt actions to manag[e] these risks and promote public health and safety.” Id., at 248, 251. Vullo and Governor Cuomo also issued a joint press release echoing many of the letters’ statements, and “ ‘urg[ing] all insurance companies and banks doing business in New York’ ” to join those “ ‘that have already discontinued their arrangements with the NRA.’ ” Id., at 244. DFS subsequently entered into separate consent decrees with Lockton, Chubb, and Lloyd’s, in which the insurers admitted violations of New York’s insurance law, agreed not to provide any NRA-endorsed insurance programs (even if lawful), and agreed to pay multimillion dollar fines.

Held: The NRA plausibly alleged that respondent violated the First Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress gun-promotion advocacy. Pp. 8–20.

(a) At the heart of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is the recognition that viewpoint discrimination is uniquely harmful to a free and democratic society. When government officials are “engaging in their own expressive conduct,” though, “the Free Speech Clause has no application.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467.  “When a government entity embarks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others,” and thus does not need to “maintain viewpoint-neutrality when its officers and employees speak about that venture.” Matal v. Tam,582 U.S. 218, 234. While a government official can share her views freely and criticize particular beliefs in the hopes of persuading others, she may not use the power of her office to punish or suppress disfavored expression.

In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, this Court explored the distinction between permissible attempts to persuade and impermissible attempts to coerce. The Court explained that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from relying on the “threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion . . . to achieve the suppression” of disfavored speech. Id., at 67. Although the defendant in Bantam Books, a state commission that blacklisted certain publications, lacked the “power to apply formal legal sanctions,” the coerced party “reasonably understood” the commission to threaten adverse action, and thus its “compliance with the [c]ommission’s directives was not voluntary.” Id., at 66–68. To reach this conclusion, the Court considered things like: the commission’s authority; the commission’s communications; and the coerced party’s reaction to the communications. Id., at 68. The Courts of Appeals have since considered similar factors to determine whether a challenged communication is reasonably understood to be a coercive threat. Ultimately, Bantam Books stands for the principle that a government official cannot directly or indirectly coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf. Pp. 8–11.

(b) To state a claim that the government violated the First Amendment through coercion of a third party, a plaintiff must plausibly allege conduct that, viewed in context, could be reasonably understood to convey a threat of adverse government action in order to punish or suppress speech. See Bantam Books, 372 U. S., at 67–68. Here, the NRA plausibly alleged that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated entities into disassociating with the NRA in order to punish or suppress gun-promotion advocacy.

As DFS superintendent, Vullo had direct regulatory and enforcement authority over all insurance companies and financial service institutions doing business in New York. She could initiate investigations, refer cases for prosecution, notice civil charges, and enter into consent decrees. Vullo’s communications with the DFS-regulated entities, particularly with Lloyd’s, must be considered against the backdrop of Vullo’s authority. Vullo made clear she wanted Lloyd’s to disassociate from all gun groups, although there was no indication that such groups had unlawful insurance policies similar to the NRA’s. Vullo also told the Lloyd’s executives she would “focus” her enforcement actions “solely” on the syndicates with ties to the NRA, “and ignore other syndicates writing similar policies.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 223, ¶69. The message was loud and clear: Lloyd’s “could avoid liability for [unrelated] infractions” if it “aided DFS’s campaign against gun groups” by terminating its business relationships with them. Ibid. As the reaction from Lloyd’s further confirms, Vullo’s alleged communications—whether seen as a threat or as an inducement—were reasonably understood as coercive. Other allegations concerning the Guidance Letters and accompanying press release, viewed in context of their issuance, reinforce the NRA’s First Amendment claim. Pp. 12–15.

(c) The Second Circuit concluded that Vullo’s alleged communications were “examples of permissible government speech” and “legitimate enforcement action.” 49 F. 4th 700, 717–719. The Second Circuit could only reach this conclusion, however, by taking the complaint’s allegations in isolation and failing to draw reasonable inferences in the NRA’s favor.

Vullo’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. The conceded illegality of the NRA-endorsed insurance programs does not insulate Vullo from First Amendment scrutiny under Bantam Books. Nor does her argument that her actions targeted “nonexpressive” business relationships change the fact that the NRA alleges her actions were aimed at punishing or suppressing speech. Finally, Vullo claims that the NRA’s position, if accepted, would stifle government speech and hamper legitimate enforcement efforts, but the Court’s conclusion simply reaffirms the general principle that where, as here, the complaint plausibly alleges coercive threats aimed at punishing or suppressing disfavored speech, the plaintiff states a First Amendment claim. Pp. 15–18.

(d) The NRA’s allegations, if true, highlight the constitutional concerns with the kind of strategy that Vullo purportedly adopted. Although the NRA was not the directly regulated party here, Vullo allegedly used the power of her office to target gun promotion by going after the NRA’s business partners. Nothing in this case immunizes the NRA from regulation nor prevents government officials from condemning disfavored views. The takeaway is that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from wielding their power selectively to punish or suppress speech, directly or (as alleged here) through private intermediaries. P. 19.

49 F. 4th 700, vacated and remanded.

Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Gorsuch, J., and Jackson, J., each filed a concurring opinion.

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