NOTICE:âThis opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports.âReaders are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 15â1293
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JOSEPH MATAL, INTERIM DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PETITIONER v. SIMON SHIAO TAM
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit
[June 19, 2017]
Justice Alito announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and IIIâA, and an opinion with respect to Parts IIIâB, IIIâC, and IV, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Breyer join.
This case concerns a dance-rock bandâs application for federal trademark registration of the bandâs name, âThe Slants.â âSlantsâ is a derogatory term for persons of Asian descent, and members of the band are Asian-Americans. But the band members believe that by taking that slur as the name of their group, they will help to âreclaimâ the term and drain its denigrating force.
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application based on a provision of federal law prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may âdisparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disreputeâ any âpersons, living or dead.â 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). We now hold that this provision violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.
I
A
âThe principle underlying trademark protection is that distinctive marksâwords, names, symbols, and the likeâcan help distinguish a particular artisanâs goods from those of others.â B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 3); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U. S. 205, 212 (2000) . A trademark âdesignate[s] the goods as the product of a particular traderâ and âprotect[s] his good will against the sale of anotherâs product as his.â United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 97 (1918) ; see also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 â413 (1916). It helps consumers identify goods and services that they wish to purchase, as well as those they want to avoid. See Wal-Mart Stores, supra, at 212â213; Park âN Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985) .
â[F]ederal law does not create trademarks.â B&B Hardware, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 3). Trademarks and their precursors have ancient origins, and trademarks were protected at common law and in equity at the time of the founding of our country. 3 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition §19:8 (4th ed. 2017) (hereinafter McCarthy); 1 id., §§5:1, 5:2, 5:3; Pattishal, The Constitutional Foundations of American Trademark Law, 78 Trademark Rep. 456, 457â458 (1988); Pattishall, Two Hundred Years of American Trademark Law, 68 Trademark Rep. 121, 121â123 (1978); see Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 92 (1879) . For most of the 19th century, trademark protection was the province of the States. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U. S. 763 â782 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 785 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Eventually, Congress stepped in to provide a degree of national uniformity, passing the first federal legislation protecting trademarks in 1870. See Act of July 8, 1870, §§77â84, 16Stat. 210â212. The foundation of current federal trademark law is the Lanham Act, enacted in 1946. See Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60Stat. 427. By that time, trademark had expanded far beyond phrases that do no more than identify a good or service. Then, as now, trademarks often consisted of catchy phrases that convey a message.
Under the Lanham Act, trademarks that are âused in commerceâ may be placed on the âprincipal register,â that is, they may be federally registered. 15 U. S. C. §1051(a)(1). And some marks âcapable of distinguishing [an] applicantâs goods or services and not registrable on the principal register . . . which are in lawful use in commerce by the owner thereofâ may instead be placed on a different federal register: the supplemental register. §1091(a). There are now more than two million marks that have active federal certificates of registration. PTO Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2016, p. 192 (Table 15), (all Internet materials as last visited June 16, 2017). This system of federal registration helps to ensure that trademarks are fully protected and supports the free flow of commerce. â[N]ational protection of trademarks is desirable,â we have explained, âbecause trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.â San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U. S. 522, 531 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Park âN Fly, Inc., supra, at 198 (âThe Lanham Act provides national protection of trademarks in order to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producersâ).
B
Without federal registration, a valid trademark may still be used in commerce. See 3 McCarthy §19:8. And an unregistered trademark can be enforced against would-be infringers in several ways. Most important, even if a trademark is not federally registered, it may still be enforceable under §43(a) of the Lanham Act, which creates a federal cause of action for trademark infringement. See Two Pesos, supra, at 768 (âSection 43(a) prohibits a broader range of practices than does §32, which applies to registered marks, but it is common ground that §43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarksâ (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).[1] Unregistered trademarks may also be entitled to protection under other federal statutes, such as the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U. S. C. §1125(d). See 5 McCarthy §25A:49, at 25Aâ198 (â[T]here is no requirement [in the Anticybersquatting Act] that the protected âmarkâ be registered: unregistered common law marks are protected by the Actâ). And an unregistered trademark can be enforced under state common law, or if it has been registered in a State, under that Stateâs registration system. See 3 id., §19:3, at 19â23 (explaining that â[t]he federal system of registration and protection does not preempt parallel state law protection, either by state common law or state registrationâ and â[i]n the vast majority of situations, federal and state trademark law peacefully coexistâ); id., §22:1 (discussing state trademark registration systems).
Federal registration, however, âconfers important legal rights and benefits on trademark owners who register their marks.â B&B Hardware, 575 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). Registration on the principal register (1) âserves as âconstructive notice of the registrantâs claim of ownershipâ of the mark,â ibid. (quoting 15 U. S. C. §1072); (2) âis âprima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the ownerâs ownership of the mark, and of the ownerâs exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate,â â B & B Hardware, 575 U. S. ___ (slip op., at 3) (quoting §1057(b)); and (3) can make a mark â âincontestableâ â once a mark has been registered for five years,â ibid. (quoting §§1065, 1115(b)); see Park âN Fly, 469 U. S., at 193. Registration also enables the trademark holder âto stop the importation into the United States of articles bearing an infringing mark.â 3 Mc-Carthy §19:9, at 19â38; see 15 U. S. C. §1124.
C
The Lanham Act contains provisions that bar certain trademarks from the principal register. For example, a trademark cannot be registered if it is âmerely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptiveâ of goods, §1052(e)(1), or if it is so similar to an already registered trademark or trade name that it is âlikely . . . to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,â §1052(d).
At issue in this case is one such provision, which we will call âthe disparagement clause.â This provision prohibits the registration of a trademark âwhich may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.â §1052(a).[2] This clause appeared in the original Lanham Act and has remained the same to this day. See §2(a), 60Stat. 428.
When deciding whether a trademark is disparaging, an examiner at the PTO generally applies a âtwo-part test.â The examiner first considers âthe likely meaning of the matter in question, taking into account not only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the matter to the other elements in the mark, the nature of the goods or services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the marketplace in connection with the goods or services.â Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure §1203.03(b)(i) (Apr. 2017), p. 1200â150, http://tmep.uspto.gov. âIf that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols,â the examiner moves to the second step, asking âwhether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite[3] of the referenced group.â Ibid. If the examiner finds that a âsubstantial composite, although not necessarily a majority, of the referenced group would find the proposed mark . . . to be disparaging in the context of contemporary attitudes,â a prima facie case of disparagement is made out, and the burden shifts to the applicant to prove that the trademark is not disparaging. Ibid. What is more, the PTO has specified that â[t]he fact that an applicant may be a member of that group or has good intentions underlying its use of a term does not obviate the fact that a substantial composite of the referenced group would find the term objectionable.â Ibid.
D
Simon Tam is the lead singer of âThe Slants.â In re Tam, 808 F. 3d 1321, 1331 (CA Fed. 2015) (en banc), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016). He chose this moniker in order to âreclaimâ and âtake ownershipâ of stereotypes about people of Asian ethnicity. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The group âdraws inspiration for its lyrics from childhood slurs and mocking nursery rhymesâ and has given its albums names such as âThe Yellow Albumâ and âSlanted Eyes, Slanted Hearts.â Ibid.
Tam sought federal registration of âTHE SLANTS,â on the principal register, App. 17, but an examining attorney at the PTO rejected the request, applying the PTOâs two-part framework and finding that âthere is . . . a substantial composite of persons who find the term in the applied-for mark offensive.â Id., at 30. The examining attorney relied in part on the fact that ânumerous dictionaries define âslantsâ or âslant-eyesâ as a derogatory or offensive term.â Id., at 29. The examining attorney also relied on a finding that âthe bandâs name has been found offensive numerous timesââciting a performance that was canceled because of the bandâs moniker and the fact that âseveral bloggers and commenters to articles on the band have indicated that they find the term and the applied-for mark offensive.â Id., at 29â30.
Tam contested the denial of registration before the examining attorney and before the PTOâs Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) but to no avail. Eventually, he took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendmentâs Free Speech Clause. The majority found that the clause en-gages in viewpoint-based discrimination, that the clause regulates the expressive component of trademarks and consequently cannot be treated as commercial speech, and that the clause is subject to and cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. See 808 F. 3d, at 1334â1339. The majority also rejected the Governmentâs argument that registered trademarks constitute government speech, as well as the Governmentâs contention that federal registration is a form of government subsidy. See id., at 1339â1355. And the majority opined that even if the disparagement clause were analyzed under this Courtâs commercial speech cases, the clause would fail the âintermediate scrutinyâ that those cases prescribe. See id., at 1355â1357.
Several judges wrote separately, advancing an assortment of theories. Concurring, Judge OâMalley agreed with the majorityâs reasoning but added that the disparagement clause is unconstitutionally vague. See id., at 1358â1363. Judge Dyk concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that trademark registration is a government subsidy and that the disparagement clause is facially constitutional, but he found the clause unconstitutional as applied to THE SLANTS because that mark constitutes âcore expressionâ and was not adopted for the purpose of disparaging Asian-Americans. See id., at 1363â1374. In dissent, Judge Lourie agreed with Judge Dyk that the clause is facially constitutional but concluded for a variety of reasons that it is also constitutional as applied in this case. See id., at 1374â1376. Judge Reyna also dissented, maintaining that trademarks are commercial speech and that the disparagement clause survives intermediate scrutiny because it âdirectly advances the governmentâs substantial interest in the orderly flow of commerce.â See id., at 1376â1382.
The Government filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted in order to decide whether the disparagement clause âis facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.â Pet. for Cert. i; see sub. nom. Lee v. Tam, 579 U. S. ___ (2016).
II
Before reaching the question whether the disparagement clause violates the First Amendment, we consider Tamâs argument that the clause does not reach marks that disparage racial or ethnic groups. The clause prohibits the registration of marks that disparage âpersons,â and Tam claims that the term âpersonsâ âincludes only natural and juristic persons,â not ânon-juristic entities such as racial and ethnic groups.â Brief for Respondent 46.
Tam never raised this argument before the PTO or the Federal Circuit, and we declined to grant certiorari on this question when Tam asked us to do so, see Brief Responding to Petition for Certiorari, pp. i, 17â21. Normally, that would be the end of the matter in this Court. See, e.g., Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519 â538 (1992); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 â895 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
But as the Government pointed out in connection with its petition for certiorari, accepting Tamâs statutory interpretation would resolve this case and leave the First Amendment question for another day. See Reply Brief 9. â[W]e have often stressedâ that it is âimportan[t] [to] avoid[d] the premature adjudication of constitutional questions,â Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 690 (1997) , and that âwe ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable,â Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105 (1944) . See also Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 461 (1945) ; Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 295 (1905) . We thus begin by explaining why Tamâs argument about the definition of âpersonsâ in the Lanham Act is meritless.
As noted, the disparagement clause prohibits the registration of trademarks âwhich may disparage . . . persons, living or dead.â 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam points to a definition of âpersonâ in the Lanham Act, which provides that â[i]n the construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is plainly apparent from the context . . . [t]he term âpersonâ and any other word or term used to designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter includes a juristic person as well as a natural person.â §1127. Because racial and ethnic groups are neither natural nor âjuristicâ persons, Tam asserts, these groups fall outside this definition. Brief for Respondent 46â48.
Tamâs argument is refuted by the plain terms of the disparagement clause. The clause applies to marks that disparage âpersons.â A mark that disparages a âsubstantialâ percentage of the members of a racial or ethnic group, Trademark Manual §1203.03(b)(i), at 1200â150, necessar-ily disparages many âpersons,â namely, members of that group. Tamâs argument would fail even if the clause used the singular term âperson,â but Congressâ use of the plural âpersonsâ makes the point doubly clear.[4]
Tamâs narrow reading of the term âpersonsâ also clashes with the breadth of the disparagement clause. By its terms, the clause applies to marks that disparage, not just âpersons,â but also âinstitutionsâ and âbeliefs.â 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). It thus applies to the members of any group whose members share particular âbeliefs,â such as political, ideological, and religious groups. It applies to marks that denigrate âinstitutions,â and on Tamâs reading, it also reaches âjuristicâ persons such as corporations, unions, and other unincorporated associations. See §1127. Thus, the clause is not limited to marks that disparage a particular natural person. If Congress had wanted to confine the reach of the disparagement clause in the way that Tam suggests, it would have been easy to do so. A neighboring provision of the Lanham Act denies registration to any trademark that â[c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent.â §1052(c) (emphasis added).
Tam contends that his interpretation of the disparagement clause is supported by its legislative history and by the PTOâs willingness for many years to register marks that plainly denigrated African-Americans and Native Americans. These arguments are unpersuasive. As always, our inquiry into the meaning of the statuteâs text ceases when âthe statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.â Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 450 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it is clear that the prohibition against registering trademarks âwhich may disparage . . . persons,â §1052(a), prohibits registration of terms that disparage persons who share a common race or ethnicity.
Even if resort to legislative history and early enforcement practice were appropriate, we would find Tamâs arguments unconvincing. Tam has not brought to our attention any evidence in the legislative history showing that Congress meant to adopt his interpretation. And the practice of the PTO in the years following the enactment of the disparagement clause is unenlightening. The admitted vagueness of the disparagement test[5] and the huge volume of applications have produced a haphazard record of enforcement. (Even today, the principal register is replete with marks that many would regard as disparaging to racial and ethnic groups.[6]) Registration of the offensive marks that Tam cites is likely attributable not to the acceptance of his interpretation of the clause but to other factorsâmost likely the regrettable attitudes and sensibilities of the time in question.
III
Because the disparagement clause applies to marks that disparage the members of a racial or ethnic group, we must decide whether the clause violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. And at the outset, we must consider three arguments that would either eliminate any First Amendment protection or result in highly permissive rational-basis review. Specifically, the Government contends (1) that trademarks are government speech, not private speech, (2) that trademarks are a form of government subsidy, and (3) that the constitutionality of the disparagement clause should be tested under a new âgovernment-programâ doctrine. We address each of these arguments below.
A
The First Amendment prohibits Congress and other government entities and actors from âabridging the freedom of speechâ; the First Amendment does not say that Congress and other government entities must abridge their own ability to speak freely. And our cases recognize that â[t]he Free Speech Clause . . . does not regulate government speech.â Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467 (2009); see Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U. S. 550, 553 (2005) (â[T]he Governmentâs own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutinyâ); Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 217, 235 (2000) .
As we have said, âit is not easy to imagine how government could functionâ if it were subject to the restrictions that the First Amendment imposes on private speech. Summum, supra, at 468; see Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U. S. ___, ___â___ (2015) (slip op., at 5â7). â â[T]he First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others,â â Lambâs Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, 394 (1993) , but imposing a requirement ofviewpoint-neutrality on government speech would be para-lyzing. When a government entity embarks on a courseof action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpointand rejects others. The Free Speech Clause does not re-quire government to maintain viewpoint neutrality when its officers and employees speak about that venture.
Here is a simple example. During the Second World War, the Federal Government produced and distributed millions of posters to promote the war effort.[7] There were posters urging enlistment, the purchase of war bonds, and the conservation of scarce resources.[8] These posters expressed a viewpoint, but the First Amendment did not demand that the Government balance the message of these posters by producing and distributing posters encouraging Americans to refrain from engaging in these activities.
But while the government-speech doctrine is importantâindeed, essentialâit is a doctrine that is susceptible to dangerous misuse. If private speech could be passed off as government speech by simply affixing a government seal of approval, government could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints. For this reason, we must exercise great caution before extending our government-speech precedents.
At issue here is the content of trademarks that are registered by the PTO, an arm of the Federal Government. The Federal Government does not dream up these marks, and it does not edit marks submitted for registration. Except as required by the statute involved here, 15 U. S. C. §1052(a), an examiner may not reject a mark based on the viewpoint that it appears to express. Thus, unless that section is thought to apply, an examiner does not inquire whether any viewpoint conveyed by a mark is consistent with Government policy or whether any such viewpoint is consistent with that expressed by other marks already on the principal register. Instead, if the mark meets the Lanham Actâs viewpoint-neutral requirements, registration is mandatory. Ibid. (requiring that â[n]o trademark . . . shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unlessâ it falls within an enumerated statutory exception). And if an examiner finds that a mark is eligible for placement on the principal register, that decision is not reviewed by any higher official unless the registration is challenged. See §§1062(a), 1071; 37 CFR §41.31(a) (2016). Moreover, once a mark is registered, the PTO is not authorized to remove it from the register unless a party moves for cancellation, the registration expires, or the Federal Trade Commission initiates proceedings based on certain grounds. See 15 U. S. C. §§1058(a), 1059, 1064; 37 CFR §§2.111(b), 2.160.
In light of all this, it is far-fetched to suggest that the content of a registered mark is government speech. If the federal registration of a trademark makes the mark government speech, the Federal Government is babbling prodigiously and incoherently. It is saying many unseemly things. See App. to Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., as Amicus Curiae. It is expressing contradictory views.[9] It is unashamedly endorsing a vast array of commercial products and services. And it is providing Delphic advice to the consuming public.
For example, if trademarks represent government speech, what does the Government have in mind when it advises Americans to âmake.believeâ (Sony),[10] âThink differentâ (Apple),[11] âJust do itâ (Nike),[12] or âHave it your wayâ (Burger King)[13]? Was the Government warning about a coming disaster when it registered the mark âEndTime Ministriesâ[14]?
The PTO has made it clear that registration does not constitute approval of a mark. See In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 USPQ 2d 1216, 1220, n. 3 (TTAB 1993) (â[I]ssuance of a trademark registration . . . is not a government imprimaturâ). And it is unlikely that more than a tiny fraction of the public has any idea what federal registration of a trademark means. See Application of National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 49 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 854, 863, 297 F. 2d 941, 949 (1962) (Rich, J., concurring) (âThe purchasing public knows no more about trademark registrations than a man walking down the street in a strange city knows about legal title to the land and buildings he passesâ (emphasis deleted)).
None of our government speech cases even remotely supports the idea that registered trademarks are government speech. In Johanns, we considered advertisements promoting the sale of beef products. A federal statute called for the creation of a program of paid advertising â âto advance the image and desirability of beef and beef products.â â 544 U. S., at 561 (quoting 7 U. S. C. § 2902(13)). Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture provided guidelines for the content of the ads, Department of Agriculture officials attended the meetings at which the content of specific ads was discussed, and the Secretary could edit or reject any proposed ad. 544 U. S., at 561. Noting that â[t]he message set out in the beef promotions [was] from beginning to end the message established by the Federal Government,â we held that the ads were government speech. Id., at 560. The Governmentâs involvement in the creation of these beef ads bears no resemblance to anything that occurs when a trademark is registered.
Our decision in Summum is similarly far afield. A small city park contained 15 monuments. 555 U. S., at 464. Eleven had been donated by private groups, and one of these displayed the Ten Commandments. Id., at 464â465. A religious group claimed that the city, by accepting donated monuments, had created a limited public forum for private speech and was therefore obligated to place in the park a monument expressing the groupâs religious beliefs.
Holding that the monuments in the park represented government speech, we cited many factors. Governments have used monuments to speak to the public since ancient times; parks have traditionally been selective in accepting and displaying donated monuments; parks would be overrun if they were obligated to accept all monuments offered by private groups; â[p]ublic parks are often closely identified in the public mind with the government unit that owns the landâ; and â[t]he monuments that are accepted . . . are meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message.â Id., at 472.
Trademarks share none of these characteristics. Trademarks have not traditionally been used to convey a Government message. With the exception of the enforcement of 15 U. S. C. §1052(a), the viewpoint expressed by a mark has not played a role in the decision whether to place it on the principal register. And there is no evidence that the public associates the contents of trademarks with the Federal Government.
This brings us to the case on which the Government relies most heavily, Walker, which likely marks the outer bounds of the government-speech doctrine. Holding that the messages on Texas specialty license plates are government speech, the Walker Court cited three factors distilled from Summum. 576 U. S., at ___â___ (slip op., at 7â8). First, license plates have long been used by the States to convey state messages. Id., at ___â___ (slip op., at 9â10). Second, license plates âare often closely identified in the public mindâ with the State, since they are manufactured and owned by the State, generally designed by the State, and serve as a form of âgovernment ID.â Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, Texas âmaintain[ed] direct control over the mes-sages conveyed on its specialty plates.â Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). As explained above, none of these factors are present in this case.
In sum, the federal registration of trademarks is vastly different from the beef ads in Johanns, the monuments in Summum, and even the specialty license plates in Walker. Holding that the registration of a trademark converts the mark into government speech would constitute a huge and dangerous extension of the government-speech doctrine. For if the registration of trademarks constituted government speech, other systems of government registration could easily be characterized in the same way.
Perhaps the most worrisome implication of the Governmentâs argument concerns the system of copyright registration. If federal registration makes a trademark government speech and thus eliminates all First Amendment protection, would the registration of the copyright for a book produce a similar transformation? See 808 F. 3d, at 1346 (explaining that if trademark registration amounts to government speech, âthen copyright registrationâ which âhas identical accoutrementsâ would âlikewise amount to government speechâ).
The Government attempts to distinguish copyright on the ground that it is â âthe engine of free expression,â â Brief for Petitioner 47 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186, 219 (2003) ), but as this case illustrates, trademarks often have an expressive content. Companies spend huge amounts to create and publicize trademarks that convey a message. It is true that the necessary brevity of trademarks limits what they can say. But powerful messages can sometimes be conveyed in just a few words.
Trademarks are private, not government, speech.
B
We next address the Governmentâs argument that this case is governed by cases in which this Court has upheld the constitutionality of government programs that subsidized speech expressing a particular viewpoint. These cases implicate a notoriously tricky question of constitutional law. â[W]e have held that the Government âmay not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.â â Agency for Intâl Development v. Alliance for Open Society Intâl, Inc., 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 8) (some internal quotation marks omitted). But at the same time, government is not required to subsidize activities that it does not wish to promote. Ibid. Determining which of these principles applies in a particular case âis not always self-evident,â id., at ___ (slip op., at 11), but no difficult question is presented here.
Unlike the present case, the decisions on which the Government relies all involved cash subsidies or their equivalent. In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173 (1991) , a federal law provided funds to private parties for family planning services. In National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U. S. 569 (1998) , cash grants were awarded to artists. And federal funding for public libraries was at issue in United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U. S. 194 (2003) . In other cases, we have regarded tax benefits as comparable to cash subsidies. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540 (1983) ; Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S 498 (1959).
The federal registration of a trademark is nothing like the programs at issue in these cases. The PTO does not pay money to parties seeking registration of a mark. Quite the contrary is true: An applicant for registration must pay the PTO a filing fee of $225â$600. 37 CFR §2.6(a)(1). (Tam submitted a fee of $275 as part of his application to register THE SLANTS. App. 18.) And to maintain federal registration, the holder of a mark must pay a fee of $300â$500 every 10 years. §2.6(a)(5); see also 15 U. S. C. §1059(a). The Federal Circuit concluded that these fees have fully supported the registration system for the past 27 years. 808 F. 3d, at 1353.
The Government responds that registration provides valuable non-monetary benefits that âare directly trace-able to the resources devoted by the federal government to examining, publishing, and issuing certificates of registration for those marks.â Brief for Petitioner 27. But just about every government service requires the expenditure of government funds. This is true of services that benefit everyone, like police and fire protection, as well as services that are utilized by only some, e.g., the adjudication of private lawsuits and the use of public parks and highways.
Trademark registration is not the only government registration scheme. For example, the Federal Government registers copyrights and patents. State governments and their subdivisions register the title to real property and security interests; they issue driverâs licenses, motor vehicle registrations, and hunting, fishing, and boating licenses or permits.
Cases like Rust and Finley are not instructive in analyzing the constitutionality of restrictions on speech imposed in connection with such services.
C
Finally, the Government urges us to sustain the disparagement clause under a new doctrine that would apply to âgovernment-programâ cases. For the most part, this argument simply merges our government-speech cases and the previously discussed subsidy cases in an attempt to construct a broader doctrine that can be applied to the registration of trademarks. The only new element in this construct consists of two cases involving a public employerâs collection of union dues from its employees. Butthose cases occupy a special area of First Amendment case law, and they are far removed from the registration of trademarks.
In Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U. S. 177 â182 (2007), a Washington law permitted a public employer automatically to deduct from the wages of employees who chose not to join the union the portion of union dues used for activities related to collective bargaining. But unless these employees affirmatively consented, the law did not allow the employer to collect the portion of union dues that would be used in election activities. Id., at 180â182. A public employee union argued that this law unconstitutionally restricted its speech based on its con-tent; that is, the law permitted the employer to assist union speech on matters relating to collective bargaining but made it harder for the union to collect money to support its election activities. Id., at 188. Upholding this law, we characterized it as imposing a âmodest limitationâ on an âextraordinary benefit,â namely, taking money from the wages of non-union members and turning it over to the union free of charge. Id., at 184. Refusing to confer an even greater benefit, we held, did not upset the marketplace of ideas and did not abridge the unionâs free speech rights. Id., at 189â190.
Ysursa v. Pocatello Ed. Assn., 555 U. S. 353 (2009) , is similar. There, we considered an Idaho law that allowed public employees to elect to have union dues deducted from their wages but did not allow such a deduction for money remitted to the unionâs political action committee. Id., at 355. We reasoned that the âthe government . . . [was] not required to assist others in funding the expression of particular ideas.â Id., at 358; see also id., at 355 (âThe First Amendment . . . does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expressionâ).
Davenport and Ysursa are akin to our subsidy cases. Although the laws at issue in Davenport and Ysursa did not provide cash subsidies to the unions, they conferred a very valuable benefitâthe right to negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement under which non-members would be obligated to pay an agency fee that the public employer would collect and turn over to the union free of charge. As in the cash subsidy cases, the laws conferred this benefit because it was thought that this arrangement served important government interests. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 â226 (1977). But the challenged laws did not go further and provide convenient collection mechanisms for money to be used in political activities. In essence, the Washington and Idaho lawmakers chose to confer a substantial non-cash benefit for the purpose of furthering activities that they particularly desired to promote but not to provide a similar benefit for the purpose of furthering other activities. Thus, Davenport and Ysursa are no more relevant for present purposes than the subsidy cases previously discussed.[15]
Potentially more analogous are cases in which a unit of government creates a limited public forum for private speech. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98 â107 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rec-tor and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 831 (1995) ; Lambâs Chapel, 508 U. S., at 392â393. See also Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U. S. 533 â544 (2001). When government creates such a forum, in either a literal or âmetaphysicalâ sense, see Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 830, some content- and speaker-based restrictions may be allowed, see id., at 830â831. However, even in such cases, what we have termed âviewpoint discriminationâ is forbidden. Id., at 831.
Our cases use the term âviewpointâ discrimination in a broad sense, see ibid., and in that sense, the disparagement clause discriminates on the bases of âviewpoint.â To be sure, the clause evenhandedly prohibits disparagement of all groups. It applies equally to marks that damn Democrats and Republicans, capitalists and socialists, and those arrayed on both sides of every possible issue. It denies registration to any mark that is offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of any group. But in the sense relevant here, that is viewpoint discrimination: Giving offense is a viewpoint.
We have said time and again that âthe public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.â Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969) . See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989) (âIf there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeableâ); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46 â56 (1988); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 615 (1971) ; Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S. 564, 567 (1970) ; Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 â514 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 551 (1965) ; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 â238 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 â5 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311 (1940) ; Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 161 (1939) ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 365 (1937) .
For this reason, the disparagement clause cannot be saved by analyzing it as a type of government program in which some content- and speaker-based restrictions are permitted.[16]
IV
Having concluded that the disparagement clause cannot be sustained under our government-speech or subsidy cases or under the Governmentâs proposed âgovernment-programâ doctrine, we must confront a dispute between the parties on the question whether trademarks are commercial speech and are thus subject to the relaxed scrutiny outlined in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commân of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980) . The Government and amici supporting its position argue that all trademarks are commercial speech. They note that the central purposes of trademarks are commercial and that federal law regulates trademarks to promote fair and orderly interstate commerce. Tam and his amici, on the other hand, contend that many, if not all, trademarks have an expressive component. In other words, these trademarks do not simply identify the source of a product or service but go on to say something more, either about the product or service or some broader issue. The trademark in this case illustrates this point. The name âThe Slantsâ not only identifies the band but expresses a view about social issues.
We need not resolve this debate between the parties because the disparagement clause cannot withstand even Central Hudson review.[17] Under Central Hudson, a restriction of speech must serve âa substantial interest,â and it must be ânarrowly drawn.â Id., at 564â565 (internal quotation marks omitted). This means, among other things, that â[t]he regulatory technique may extend only as far as the interest it serves.â Id., at 565. The disparagement clause fails this requirement.
It is claimed that the disparagement clause serves two interests. The first is phrased in a variety of ways in the briefs. Echoing language in one of the opinions below, the Government asserts an interest in preventing â âunderrepresented groupsâ â from being â âbombarded with demeaning messages in commercial advertising.â â Brief for Petitioner 48 (quoting 808 F. 3d, at 1364 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). An amicus supporting the Government refers to âencouraging racial tolerance and protecting the privacy and welfare of individuals.â Brief for Native American Organizations as Amici Curiae 21. But no matter how the point is phrased, its unmistakable thrust is this: The Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that offend. And, as we have explained, that idea strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express âthe thought that we hate.â United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The second interest asserted is protecting the orderly flow of commerce. See 808 F. 3d, at 1379â1381 (Reyna, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner 49; Brief for Native American Organizations as Amicus Curiae 18â21. Commerce, we are told, is disrupted by trademarks that âinvolv[e] disparagement of race, gender, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, and similar demographic classification.â 808 F. 3d, at 1380â1381 (opinion of Reyna, J.). Such trademarks are analogized to discriminatory conduct, which has been recognized to have an adverse effect on commerce. See ibid.; Brief for Petitioner 49;Brief for Native American Organizations as Amici Curiae 18â20.
A simple answer to this argument is that the disparagement clause is not ânarrowly drawnâ to drive out trademarks that support invidious discrimination. The clause reaches any trademark that disparages any person, group, or institution. It applies to trademarks like the following: âDown with racists,â âDown with sexists,â âDown with homophobes.â It is not an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happy-talk clause. In this way, it goes much further than is necessary to serve the interest asserted.
The clause is far too broad in other ways as well. The clause protects every person living or dead as well as every institution. Is it conceivable that commerce would be disrupted by a trademark saying: âJames Buchanan was a disastrous presidentâ or âSlavery is an evil institutionâ?
There is also a deeper problem with the argument that commercial speech may be cleansed of any expression likely to cause offense. The commercial market is well stocked with merchandise that disparages prominent figures and groups, and the line between commercial and non-commercial speech is not always clear, as this case illustrates. If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social âvolatility,â free speech would be endangered.
*ââ¶Ä*ââ¶Ä*
For these reasons, we hold that the disparagement clause violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The judgment of the Federal Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Notes
1 In the opinion below, the Federal Circuit opined that although âSection 43(a) allows for a federal suit to protect an unregistered trademark,â âit is not at all clearâ that respondent could bring suit under §43(a) because âthere is no authority extending §43(a) to marks denied under §2(a)âs disparagement provision.â In re Tam, 808 F. 3d 1321, 1344â1345, n.11 (en banc), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016). When drawing this conclusion, the Federal Circuit relied in part on our statement in Two Pesos that âthe general principles qualifying a mark for registration under §2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under §43(a).â 505 U. S., at 768. We need not decide today whether respondent could bring suit under §43(a) if his application for federal registration had been lawfully denied under the disparagement clause.
2 The disparagement clause also prevents a trademark from being registered on the supplemental register. §1091(a).
3 By âcomposite,â we assume the PTO means component.
4 Tam advances a convoluted textual argument that goes as follows. The definition of a âpersonâ in 15 U. S. C. §1127 does not include a ânon-juristic person,â i.e., a group that cannot sue or be sued in its own right. Brief for Respondent 46â47. Such groups consist of multiple natural persons. Therefore, the members of such groups are not âpersonsâ under the disparagement clause. Id., at 46â48.
5 The PTO has acknowledged that the guidelines âfor determining whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging are somewhat vague and the determination of whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging is necessarily a highly subjective one.â In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 USPQ 2d 1653, 1654 (TTAB 1990) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The PTO has similarly observed that whether a mark is disparaging âis highly subjective and, thus, general rules are difficult to postulate.â Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 USPQ 2d 1705, 1737 (TTAB 1999), revâd, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (DC 2003), revâd and remanded in part, 415 F. 3d 44 (CADC 2005) (per curiam).
6 See, e.g., App. to Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., as Amicus Curiae.
7 See, e.g., D. Nelson, The Posters That Won the War (1991).
8 Ibid.
9 Compare âAbolish Abortion,â Registration No. 4,935,774 (Apr. 12, 2016), with âI Stand With Planned Parenthood,â Registration No. 5,073,573 (Nov. 1, 2016); compare âCapitalism Is Not Moral, Not Fair, Not Freedom,â Registration No. 4,696,419 (Mar. 3, 2015), with âCapitalism Ensuring Innovation,â Registration No. 3,966,092 (May 24, 2011); compare âGlobal Warming Is Good,â Registration No. 4,776,235 (July 21, 2015), with âA Solution to Global Warming,â Registration No. 3,875,271 (Nov. 10, 2010).
10 âmake.believe,â Registration No. 4,342,903 (May 28, 2013).
11 âThink Different,â Registration No. 2,707,257 (Apr. 15, 2003).
12 âJust Do It,â Registration No. 1,875,307 (Jan. 25, 1995).
13 âHave It Your Way,â Registration No. 0,961,016. (June 12, 1973)
14 âEndTime Ministries,â Registration No. 4,746,225 (June 2, 2015).
15 While these cases resemble subsidy cases insofar as the free speech rights of unions and their members are concerned, arrangements like those in these cases also implicate the free speech rights of non-union members. Our decision here has no bearing on that issue.
16 We leave open the question whether this is the appropriate framework for analyzing free speech challenges to provisions of the Lanham Act.
17 As with the framework discussed in Part IIIâC of this opinion, we leave open the question whether Central Hudson provides the appropriate test for deciding free speech challenges to provisions of the Lanham Act. And nothing in our decision should be read to speak to the validity of state unfair competition provisions or product libel laws that are not before us and differ from §1052(d)âs disparagement clause.