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Whether a municipal sign code that restricts posting based on purpose is either content-based or content-neutral and, if content-based, whether the code survives strict scrutiny.

Do Vermonts mandatory limits on candidate expenditures violate the First Amendment as interpreted in Buckley v. Valeo (1976)?

Whether the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) induces public libraries to violate the 1st Amendment, thereby exceeding Congress's power under the Spending Clause by providing that a library that is otherwise eligible for special federal assistance for Internet access in the form of discount rates for educational purposes under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 254(h), or grants under the Library Services and Technology Act, 20 U.S.C. 9121 et seq., may not receive that assistance unless the library has in place a policy that includes the operation of a technology protection measure on Internet-connected computers that protects against access by all persons to visual depictions that are obscene or child pornography, and that protects against access by minors to visual depictions that are harmful to minors, a condition of the receipt of federal funding.

Whether the "harmful to minors provisions" of the Child Online Protection Act violate the First Amendment.

Whether publication of lawfully obtained communications that had been recorded by an illegal wiretap is protected by the First Amendment, despite being prohibited by a statute.

A Colorado statue establishes a 100-foot zone around the entrance to any "health care facility." Within this buffer zone, people may not, without consent "knowingly approach another person within 8 feet," for the purpose of passing out literature or engaging in "oral protest, education, or counseling" on a public sidewalk. The question is whether the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the speaker are abridged by the protection the statute provides for the unwilling listener.

Whether a federal law requiring cable operators to "fully scramble" indecent and sexually explicit programming on adult stations violate the First Amendment.

Whether the city of Erie's ban on public nudity violates the First Amendment or is a valid exercise of the city's power to regulate harmful secondary effects associated with nude-dancing establishments.

Whether a mandatory student activity fee used to facilitate extracurricular student speech at a public university violates the First Amendment.

Whether a law requiring the National Endowment for the Arts to consider "general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public" before awarding grants to artistic projects is impermissibly viewpoint-based and unconstitutionally vague.

Whether the government may constitutionally require cable television system operators to carry local broadcast stations.

Whether a public university can deny funds to a religious student group that it provides to nonreligious student groups.

Whether the court-mandated inclusion of the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. (GLIB) in Boston’s 1993 St. Patrick’s Day parade violated the First Amendment rights of the private group, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, that the city of Boston authorized to organize the parade.

Whether a local school district that allows its facilities to be used for social and civic purposes may prevent a religious organization from using the facilities to show a movie that presents family issues from a religious perspective.

Whether a city ordinance prohibiting the distribution of commercial flyers from news racks on city-owned property violates the First Amendment.

Whether an ordinance punishing such action that “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender” violates the First Amendment.

Whether a New York statute that required that an accused or convicted criminal's income from speech describing his crime be deposited in an escrow account for possible distribution to the criminal's victims or other creditors violated the First Amendment.

Whether the First Amendment prevents a state from imposing a sales tax on only selected segments of the media.

Whether a New York City regulation requiring performers in Central Park to use the city's sound amplification system and technicians violates the First Amendment

Whether Gregory Lee Johnson's conviction under a Texas law for publicly burning an American flag in protest violates the First Amendment.

Whether a law outlawing signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy tending to bring the foreign government into "public odium " or "public disrepute" and gatherings that refuse to disperse violates the First Amendment.

Whether a high school principal’s removal of two articles from the student newspaper about pregnancy and divorce violated the First Amendment rights of the student editors. To what extent, consistent with the First Amendment, may educators exercise editorial control over school-sponsored speech?

Whether a state sales tax scheme that taxes general interest magazines, but exempts newspapers and religious, professional, trade, and sports journals, violates the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press

Whether federal exclusion of legal defense and political advocacy organizations from participation in a charity drive aimed at federal employees violates the First Amendment

Whether a federal law that prohibits a photographic color reproduction of United States currency on the cover of a magazine is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to a magazine publisher.

Whether the denial of a permit to protestors requesting to camp out in Washington D.C. parks, according to Park Service regulations, violated the protestors' First Amendment rights.

Whether an interschool mail system's grant of mail access to the Perry Education Association but no other union violated the First Amendment's free speech guarantee.

Whether a state, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, may confine religious organizations wishing to sell and distribute religious literature at a state fair to an assigned location within the fairgrounds.

Whether a state statute that bars picketing of residences or dwellings, but exempts from its prohibition "the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute" violates the First Amendment because it is not content-neutral.

Whether an order of appellee New York Public Service Commission that prohibits the inclusion by appellant and other public utility companies in monthly bills of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy directly infringes the freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and thus is invalid.

Whether striking union members have a First Amendment free speech right to picket inside a shopping center in order to advertise their strike against the owner of one of the stores.

Whether a state may punish speech that is not part of “narrowly limited classes of speech” outside First Amendment protection (such as incitement, obscenity, or fighting words), and whether advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future period qualifies as incitement.

"Does appellants' action in refusing to allow an alien scholar to enter the country to attend academic meetings violate the First Amendment rights of American scholars and students who had invited him?"

Does a Chicago city ordinance which bans non-union picketing within 150 feet of a school building violate both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Whether an Ohio law prohibiting speech that advocates for illegal activities violated Brandenburg's First Amendment rights.

This case draws into question the constitutionality a section of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,which provides that, when a Communist-action organization is under a final order to register, it shall be unlawful for any member of the organization "to engage in any employment in any defense facility."

Whether the Florida Legislative Investigative Committee, in an attempt to inform itself about activities of subversive organizations, violated petitioners First and Fourteenth Amendment association rights.

Does requiring individuals to register their political party affiliation with the Attorney General violate the First Amendment?

Whether the membership clause of the Smith Act, as applied to an "active member" of the Communist party, infringes on freedoms of expression and association in violation of the First Amendment.

Whether a conviction under the membership clause of the Smith Act was based on sufficient evidence that a Communist Party member "presently advocated forcible overthrow of the Government."

Whether a Louisiana statute which compels teachers in public institutions to disclose which organizations they belong or contribute to unconstitutionally burdens a teachers 14th Amendment right of free association.

Whether the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities inquiry into petitioners past or present membership in the Communist Party violated the First Amendment.

Whether a California law requiring a loyalty oath in order to gain a tax exemption violated due process of law.

Whether the conviction of 14 Communists under the Smith Act for conspiring to "advocate and teach the duty of overthrowing the government by force or violence" violated the First Amendment

Whether an investigation conducted under the aegis of state legislature to determine whether a professor was a subversive person in the state and including asking him for the contents of a lecture he gave at the state university and his knowledge of the Progressive Party violated the First Amendment.

Whether a state loyalty oath violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Whether the Alien Registration Act of 1940, authorizing the deportation of legally resident aliens because of membership in the Communist Party, violated freedom of speech and assembly in contravention of the First Amendment.

Whether the Smith Act which makes it a crime to "knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or by assignation" is on its face and as applied to the Petitioners violative of the First Amendment.

Whether the police can charge a speaker with disorderly conduct for continuing to speak to a restless and hostile crowd.

Whether sect. 9 (h) of the Taft Hartley Act (1947) which required officers of labor unions to sign affidavits indicating that they were not members of the Communist Party, or supporters of it, or advocated the violent overthrow of the government violated the First Amendment

Does the First Amendment protect people’s right to say things that make other people so angry that it may lead them to cause unrest?

Whether a Mississippi statute punishing speech "reasonably tending to create an attitude of stubborn refusal to salute, honor, and respect the flag and government of the United States" or "calculated to encourage disloyalty to the government of the United States" violates the First Amendment

Whether a Georgia law prohibiting an "attempt to incite insurrection" was unconstitutional as applied to a Communist member planning to distribute literature, because the law was too vague to provide a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt.

Whether, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, mere participation in a meeting called by the Communist Party can be criminalized.

Whether quoting in print "equivocal language" from the preamble to the IWW Constitution amounted to criminal syndicalism unprotected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Whether California's criminal syndicalism law that made it a crime to defend, advocate, or establish an organization committed to violent means of effecting government change violated the First Amendment.

Whether (1) the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment applies to states, and (2) whether the state criminal anarchy law violated First Amendment.

Whether the Espionage Act violates the First Amendment as applied to distributing leaflets calling for a strike at U.S. ammunitions plants.

Whether a political candidate’s speech that was considered to obstruct the United States’ war effort in violation of the Espionage Act deserved First Amendment protection.

Whether a conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917 for circulating anti-war articles should be overturned on First Amendment grounds.

Charles Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act for distributing anti-war leaflets that urged people to boycott the draft.